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Trade unions and the redesign of South 
Africa’s minimum wage-setting 






South African trade unions’ criticisms in the 2010s of the institutional framework 
for minimum-wage-setting mark a dramatic departure from the central role they 
played in the design of these institutions in the 1990s. The four key features of the 
institutional framework – i.e. the emphasis on sectoral rather than national wage-
setting, the primacy attached to collective bargaining, the role of technocrats in 
wage-setting in sectors where there was insufficient worker or employer 
organisation for effective collective bargaining, and the stipulation that 
employment effects be taken into account in setting minima in unorganised sectors 
– all reflected concerns raised by trade unions themselves. The trade unions’ 
approach in the 1990s reflected their own sectoral organisational form, their 
strong shopfloor organisation and distrust of the state, and anxieties about job 






Since 2012, South Africa’s dominant and powerful trade union federation – the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) – has proposed that the 
country’s minimum wage-setting institutions be transformed through the 
introduction of a high national minimum wage in place of the existing system of 
varied sectoral minima, with the level of the minimum being set through a political 
process. COSATU’s lobbying ensured that the African National Congress (ANC) 
included in its 2014 election manifesto a rather vague commitment to a national 
minimum wage and, after the election, initiated a consultative process to sort out 
the details. COSATU’s demands for a national minimum reflected the unions’ 
discontent with the entire existing wage-setting institutional framework, established 
by the ANC-led post-apartheid government through the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) and 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act. The LRA provided for 
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minimum wages to be set in sectors with strong trade unions through bipartite 
collective agreements between them and employers’ associations, in ‘bargaining 
councils’, and then ‘extended’ countrywide by the Minister of Labour. The Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act provided for the Minister of Labour to set 
minimum wages covering ‘vulnerable’ workers in sectors without their own 
bargaining councils, through a ‘sectoral determination’, on the advice of a new 
tripartite Employment Conditions Commission (ECC). From 2012, COSATU 
criticised this wage-setting framework on the grounds that the “apartheid wage 
structure” had barely changed, with “the majority of black workers continu[ing] to 
live in poverty”. In many sectors, COSATU claimed, both bargaining councils and 
the ECC had, in practice, been captured by business or allied technocrats. The 
“entire wage-fixing system” needed “to be re-evaluate”, COSATU stated, with the 
adoption of “effective, large-scale state intervention in the wage structure” 
(Coleman, 2013: 2-3, 6-7; COSATU, 2015). COSATU proposed that the existing 
decentralised, corporatist or technocratic institutions be replaced with a highly 
centralised system through which trade unions could use their political power to 
effect a national minimum wage between two and three times higher than the 
lowest sectoral minima set by bargaining councils or the ECC. 
 
COSATU’s criticisms of South Africa’s post-apartheid wage-setting institutions 
entailed a reversal of its position in the 1990s, when COSATU had played a major 
role in establishing these very institutions. In the early 1990s COSATU debated the 
redesign of apartheid-era institutions, opted to preserve a decentralised, sectoral 
system of wage-setting, and supported the relevant legislation. If COSATU 
succeeds in the mid-2010s in pushing for a high, national, centrally-imposed 
minimum wage, then the mid-2010s will prove to be more of a ‘critical 
conjuncture’ than the moment of democratisation in the 1990s. This paper explores 
how and why COSATU supported in the 1990s the design of institutions that now, 
two decades later, it criticises. The paper focuses on the politics of wage-setting in 
lower-wage sectors, drawing on selected files from the COSATU archives at the 






                                                
1 I am grateful to Patrick Craven for permission to use the COSATU archive, and to the archivists 
in the Wits William Cullen Library for their assistance. The COSATU papers are AH 2373. 
Below, they are referenced as COSATU, with the file number. 
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The international context 
 
Most advanced capitalist and middle-income countries have institutions for 
regulating wages. Unfortunately, although there is a large literature on the political 
economy of labour market policies generally, very little has been written about the 
political economy of minimum wage-setting institutions specifically. Scholars have 
explored variation in the overall shape of labour market regulation, i.e. why some 
advanced capitalist countries developed more tightly co-ordinated systems of 
centralized bargaining, others invested in active labour market policies and yet 
others provided only a minimum floor through statutory minimum wages or tax-
financed income support (see, for example, Bonoli, 2003, 2013; Crettaz & Bonoli, 
2010), but analysis is constrained by the challenges of measuring precisely 
institutional design (see Kenworthy, 2001). One thing that can be measured is the 
level of the minimum wage, so it is unsurprising that there have been attempts to 
measure the causes of variation in minimum wages. The existence of sub-national 
variation in minimum wages in the USA has generated a large literature on its 
political (and other) correlates (summarized in Neumark & Wascher, 2007: Chapter 
8). Boeri (2012) examines how the extent of governments’ delegation of authority 
over wage-setting to organized labour and business affects the level at which 
minima are set. But – with the exception of a recent case-study of recent reforms in 
Germany (Mabbett, forthcoming)2 – there is no comparative literature explaining 
variation in the design of minimum-wage setting institutions.  
 
The international context is important not only for analytic purposes, but also 
because reformers in South Africa in the 1990s – as in many other countries at 
different times – were not unaware of the existence of diverse ‘models’ for reform. 
For the preceding seventy or more years, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) had collated and distributed widely information about the design of 
minimum wage-setting institutions as part of its promotion of minimum wage-
setting. The ILO adopted relevant Conventions (and accompanying 
Recommendations) in 1928 (the Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 
no.26, covering manufacturing and commercial trades), 1951 (the Minimum Wage-
Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, no. 99) and 1970 (the Minimum 
Wage-Fixing Convention, no. 131, which with Recommendation 135 paid closer 
attention to the needs of developing countries) (see Marinakis, 2009; Rodgers et al., 
2009: 126-36). The ILO’s approach was spelt out in its handbook on minimum 
wage-setting: Minimum Wage Fixing: An International Review of Practices and 
                                                
2 Mabbett focuses on ‘delegation’ (to corporatist or technocratic institutions) rather than the 
choice between national centralization versus sectoral decentralization. 
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Problems, by Gerald Starr, first published in 1981 and republished in 1993 with 
corrections. Starr’s book remained the basic ‘text’ until 2005, when the ILO 
published The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing by François Eyraud and 
Catherine Saget. 
 
In practice, as Starr wrote bluntly, there was “little uniformity among countries in 
the methods they use to fix minimum wages or to decide upon the groups of 
workers who should receive legal protection of their wages”. Some countries’ 
systems reflected distinct colonial or regional influences, but overall, “diversity 
prevails” (Starr, 1993: 61). The ILO’s publications informed national policy-
makers about the diverse options for institutional design, including especially over 
the ‘delegation’ of authority (from government to corporatist or technocratic 
institutions) and ‘decentralisation’ (from national to sectoral or regional levels). 
With respect to ‘delegation’, the ILO promoted a particular approach. With respect 
to ‘decentralisation’, it avoided identifying any one design as ‘best practice’.  
 
The ILO advocated what it called a ‘balanced approach’ with clear 
recommendations on the composition of the wage-setting institutions and the 
criteria to be taken into account in setting the wage. The ILO’s 1970 Convention 
suggested (with some qualifications) that wage-setting should be undertaken by 
representatives of employers and workers, together with ‘persons having 
recognised competence for representing the general interests of the country and 
appointed after full consultation with representative organisations of employers and 
workers concerned, where such organisations exist and such consultation is in 
accordance with national law or practice’ (Article 4). Article 3 specified “the 
elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum 
wages”:  
 
‘(a) the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the 
general level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security 
benefits, and the relative living standards of other social groups; (b) 
economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, 
levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a 
high level of employment’.  
 
The inclusion of these Articles in the 1970 Convention marked a departure from the 
earlier 1928 and 1951 Conventions, and reflected the developmental imperatives 
facing developing countries. The accompanying Recommendation provided more 
detail, but without prescribing any specific institutional form (ILO, 2014). The ILO 
was clear that design matters: “minimum wage systems need to be well designed” 
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and “carefully crafted”, with minimum wages set at a level that “balances the needs 
of workers and their families with economic factors, to avoid counterproductive 
macroeconomic and employment effects” (ILO, 2013: 45-6). 
 
In practice, the wage-regulatory process in most countries involved delegation to 
organized labour, business and technocrats. In most countries minima were 
recommended or set by an independent, ‘almost invariably tripartite’ institution, 
often called a ‘wage board’. In some countries (such as Costa Rica, Mexico and the 
UK in the late 1970s and 1980s), minima were set by the board itself. In others, the 
executive had some discretion in accepting the board’s recommendation or advice. 
Boeri (2012) categorized these as ‘bargained’ and ‘consultative’ respectively. In 
some cases, the executive had more discretion, and in exceptional cases (notably 
the USA) the legislature set the minimum. ILO researchers later collated data on 
the delegation of authority. They found that in 16 percent of the cases on their 
database, a specialist agency set the minima itself, and in another 14 percent of 
cases the government simply ratified the decision of a bilateral corporatist process. 
In 45 percent of cases the government set the minimum after consulting with or 
after receiving a recommendation from a specialist agency (for example, the UK, 
from 1999). In another 11 percent of cases the government set the minimum after 
consulting with business and labour (for example, Brazil). In only 13 percent of 
cases did the government alone set the minimum (Belser & Sobeck, 2012: 109). 
Delegation mattered. Boeri (2012) demonstrated that less delegation correlated 
with lower minima, as economic and developmental concerns were taken into 
account. Minimum wages were highest in ‘bargained’ fora and lowest when 
government had sole authority. Corporatist wage-setting institutions also increased 
unemployment (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015: 24). 
 
In contrast, the ILO had no clear position on the merits of ‘decentralisation’, i.e. of 
national as opposed to sectoral (or regional) minimum-setting. Starr recognized that 
a national minimum had both advantages and disadvantages, especially in 
developing countries. On the one hand, a national (‘basic floor’) minimum wage 
was easier to administer and helped to ensure broader coverage. On the other, it 
was “difficult to establish” because “deciding upon an appropriate level for the 
floor is more complex and subject to greater uncertainties than fixing wages in 
individual industries” (Starr, 1993: 41-2), and often posed problems of 
enforcement. Any minimum might require either exemptions (for example, for 
small businesses) or abatements (for example, for younger workers), but a national 
minimum might require additional sectoral exemptions (most obviously in sectors 
such as agriculture and domestic work) (ibid: 55-9). 
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The absence of clear ‘best practice’ with respect to centralization reflected the 
diversity of minimum wage-setting institutions around the world. Minimum wage-
setting originated in Australia and New Zealand at the end of the nineteenth 
century, before being taken up in the United Kingdom in 1909 (with very limited 
coverage) and 1918 (more generally). The British model, which diffused widely 
across its colonies, was sectoral, focused on the regulation of ‘sweating’ (i.e. on 
low-wage ‘sweatshops’) in selected industrial and commercial sectors. Minimum 
wage-setting was less extensive across much of Europe, especially in countries 
where collective bargaining had widespread coverage. Germany, for example, 
passed legislation in 1952 that made residual wage fixing possible, but did not use 
this legislation over the following sixty years. In most of these advanced capitalist 
countries minimum wage-setting developed as a residual system, protecting 
workers who were not covered by collective bargaining. Collective bargaining was 
given priority. The result was a general preference for sectoral wage-setting, in 
sectors not covered by collective bargaining. Wage-setting had different origins in 
the USA (and Canada). Minimum wage-setting began with the regulation of 
employment for women and children specifically, and at the sub-national level. In 
1938 the Fair Labor Standards Act in the USA provided for the first time for a 
national minimum for workers involved in inter-state (or international) commerce. 
The design in the USA was therefore regional and national rather than sectoral. 
 
In many developing countries, where collective bargaining was very limited, 
governments followed the US lead in opting for a national minimum. Spain 
adopted a national minimum in the 1960s, and Portugal in 1974. A number of 
former British colonies (for example, Jamaica in 1975) shifted from sectoral 
minimum-setting to a national minimum. India considered doing so in the 1970s 
(Starr, 1993: 23-9 etc). In Brazil, a single national minimum replaced regional 
minima in the 1980s (de Melo et al., 2012). In the 1990s, the UK followed suit. The 
Conservative Party government had whittled away the scope of sectoral minimum 
wage-setting before finally abolishing it in 1993. The opposition Labour Party 
committed itself to introduce a national minimum if elected into government. After 
taking office in 1997, the Labour government established an independent Low Pay 
Commission to recommend a national minimum, taking into account the effects on 
costs, competitiveness, employment and inflation (Metcalf, 1999; Thornley & 
Coffey, 1999). One reason for the growing interest in national minima in the UK 
and elsewhere was the decline of collective bargaining (itself the result of, inter 
alia, globalization) (Eyraud & Saget, 2005: 2). By the 2010s, approximately one 
half of minimum wage systems entailed a single national or regional minimum, 
whilst about one half provided for multiple minima by industry or occupation (ILO, 
2013: 50).  
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At the time that South Africa was considering reforms to its minimum wage-setting 
institutions, however, several other countries were explicitly deciding not to 
introduce a statutory national minimum. In Germany, a national minimum wage 
was discussed, but at the time neither trade unions nor the major political parties 
were enthusiastic, and proposals were put aside (Mabbett, 2015). In India, also, 
another round of debate over reforming the country’s extraordinarily complex 
system of regional and occupational minima did not lead to a statutory national 
minimum. In 1991 the National Commission for Rural Labour recommended the 
introduction of a national minimum wage floor, but the government cautiously only 
set (in 1996) an advisory (i.e. non-binding) national minimum wage floor. The 
international landscape in the 1990s was characterized not only by an enduring 
diversity of institutional forms for wage regulation but also by diverse choices 
being made over the direction of reform. There was no self-evident model for 
South Africa to copy.  
 
 
South Africa’s Wage-Setting Institutions Prior to 
Democratisation  
 
Other countries might have offered an array of possible institutional models for 
wage-setting, but South Africans’ choices in the 1990s were framed by their 
institutional inheritance. The ANC-led government formed in 1994 inherited a set 
of wage-setting institutions that had atrophied and enjoyed uneven support among 
employers and unions, but nonetheless offered models that might be reformed more 
easily than discarded and replaced. The institutions had obvious flaws: Both the 
existing LRA, which provided for collective bargaining through industrial councils, 
and the existing Wage Act, which provided for a Wage Board to set minimum 
wages for workers in sectors without collective bargaining, had for the most part 
been used to protect the interests of white workers against competition from black 
workers, and not to protect the interests of low-wage black workers. Could these 
procedures and institutions be reformed to be inclusive, i.e. to benefit black 
workers? This question was of special concern to the ‘independent’ trade unions, 
organising black workers, which emerged in the 1970s and grew rapidly in the 
1980s. The new unions’ approaches to wage-setting played a decisive role in the 
post-1994 institutional redesign. 
 
The original design of South Africa’s wage-setting institutions was informed by 
experiences in the UK and its dominions Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The 
origins of the LRA lay in the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which provided for 
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the institutionalisation of collective bargaining in sectoral ‘industrial councils’ and 
for the statutory application of collective agreements to both the parties to the 
agreements and ‘non-parties’ (i.e. employers and workers who had not signed up to 
the agreements) through ‘extensions’ gazetted by the Minister of Labour. Non-
compliance with an agreement or extension that had been gazetted by the Minister 
constituted a criminal offence. The sectoral design replicated the UK and 
dominions. In contrast to the UK, however, the South African legislation 
discriminated racially. The result was a system of minimum wage-setting through 
collective bargaining that protected the interests of organised white workers, 
ensuring that they were paid well in compensation for desisting from strikes and 
acquiescing in systematic discrimination against less skilled, black workers (Van 
der Horst, 1942: 245-51).  
 
Wages in sectors where unions and employers were too weak to engage in 
collective bargaining were first regulated under the 1925 Wage Act, which 
established a Wage Board to set minimum wages through sectoral ‘wage 
determinations’. Although the Wage Acts did not exclude all black workers from 
the scope of wage determinations, their purpose was also primarily to use minimum 
wages to protect white workers from competition from black workers (van der 
Horst, 1948: 252-66). At times the Wage Board did set and raise minimum wages 
for some African workers, at times even reducing the racial ‘wage gap’. For the 
most part, however, the wages of unskilled black workers remained unregulated. 
Farm workers, domestic workers and all public sector employees were explicitly 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Wage Board. Under apartheid, the bantustans 
were also not covered by the Wage Act, although some of the bantustans enacted 
their own legislation (Standing, Sender & Weeks, 1996: 143ff; Nattrass & 
Seekings, 1997). 
 
Economic growth and change under apartheid reduced the need for minimum 
wage-setting for white workers whilst empowering black workers to demand full 
inclusion in wage-regulating machinery. In the 1970s, university-based ‘student 
wage commissions’, working with African workers in nascent non-racial 
‘independent’ trade unions, lobbied the Wage Board for minimum wage increases 
in line with the estimated cost of living (Davie, 2007). Unrecognised by the state 
and excluded from the industrial council system, the nascent non-racial trade 
unions found that Wage Board hearings provided a useful opportunity to embarrass 
low-paying employers. Faced with rising militancy from African workers and their 
unions, as well as demands from employers that African workers be allowed to 
enter into more skilled occupations, the government-appointed Wiehahn 
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Commission recommended that trade unions representing African workers should 
be allowed to register and to participate in industrial councils (South Africa, 1979). 
 
The ‘white’ trade unions and most employers were ambivalent about the industrial 
councils, but the fast-growing ‘independent’ trade unions began to be attracted to 
the prospect of negotiating over wages and benefits at the sectoral level, through 
the councils, rather than factory by factory. In 1981, for the first time, one of the 
smaller independent unions joined the industrial council in the metals industry. “By 
mid-1987”, almost all of the unions affiliated to the newly-established COSATU 
“were committed in principle to centralized bargaining and participation in 
industrial councils” (Baskin, 1991: 257). Participation fuelled the growth of the 
new unions, which soon became the majority unions on the councils. COSATU 
pushed for industrial councils to cover the entire country (Godfrey & Macun, 1992: 
400). 
 
The new unions reinvigorated the industrial council system, using it just as white 
workers’ unions had used it earlier in the century, to push up minimum wages and 
to secure improved benefits and working conditions.  Unions affiliated to COSATU 
rightly saw that the ‘wage gap’ – i.e. the gap between the salaries and wages paid to 
better-paid (mostly white) employees and the wages paid to unskilled workers – 
was very wide, and that most of their members (including semi-skilled as well as 
unskilled workers) were paid less than a ‘living wage’. The industrial councils 
enabled unions to push for higher wages despite high unemployment and 
competition from cheap imports. The councils also enabled unions to regulate 
wages even in firms where they had failed to organise the workers, taking some of 
the pressure off union organisers. At the same time, union-allied organisations 
sought to use the Wage Board to raise the wages of workers in sectors without 
strong unions. COSATU identified low wages as a priority, in both sectors where it 
organised and those where it was weak or absent altogether. At its founding 
congress in 1985, COSATU passed a resolution calling for “a legally enforced 
national minimum living wage for all workers” (quoted in Young, 1991: 1). In 
1987, COSATU initiated a ‘Living Wage’ campaign, although it avoided 
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Debating Minimum Wages within COSATU, 1990-
92 
 
In February 1990 the National Party Government unbanned the ANC (and South 
African Communist Party) and committed itself to negotiations over political 
change. The ANC had already begun to consider policy in anticipation of political 
change, and discussions now intensified. In September 1990, the ANC produced a 
first draft of a Discussion Document on Economic Policy. The most important 
discussions about wage-setting took place within COSATU, however. The ANC’s 
Discussion Document was drafted at joint ANC-COSATU workshops. At the same 
time – in September 1990 – the South African Government committed itself (under 
the ‘Laboria Minute’) to negotiating any reforms of labour legislation with 
COSATU (and other unions) and employers (Nattrass, 1994). COSATU had 
considerably more capacity to consider wage and labour policy reforms than the 
ANC. 
 
Registration, participation in industrial councils and the prospect of the 
democratisation of state power swung the COSATU unions in favour of using state 
or parastatal institutions to achieve their goals. COSATU’s Living Wage Campaign 
led to serious debate over a national minimum wage in the early 1990s. Deeply 
divided over the merits of a national minimum compared to sectoral minima, 
COSATU opted to reform rather than transform the existing institutions. 
 
In February 1990 the Central Executive Committee of COSATU decided to 
‘intensify and broaden’ its campaign for a living wage. It seems that COSATU’s 
Living Wage Committee (LWC) may have asked the union-aligned, Cape Town-
based Labour Research Service (LRS) to prepare some documentation for 
discussion.3 In March, Gordon Young of the LRS distributed a document entitled 
‘A National Minimum Wage: Stepping stone to the Living Wage’ (Young, 1990). 
This discussed a national minimum wage as an “intermediate demand in addition to 
the ultimate goal of the Living Wage”. It proposed the figure of R700 per month 
(the equivalent of approximately R3500 per month in 2012, or R4000 in early 
2015). This was just above the average wage at the time, but was far below a 
‘living wage’ (which Young calculated to be more than R1100 per month). The 
goal seems to have been primarily to ensure that more low-paid workers would be 
                                                
3 This seems to be implied in ‘Report of the Living Wage Committee to the NCC, April 1990’ 
(COSATU file 12.45). 
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covered and would be paid a minimum wage. Crucially, farmworkers would be 
covered. Young asserted confidently that there was  
 
‘no reason why farming operations should not be able to afford 
reasonable wages. Some wine farmers in the Western Cape have agreed 
recently to pay R500 per month; unions in the farming sector should 
therefore have no difficulty in demanding a minimum of R700’.  
 
The proposed national minimum would not be entirely national, however, in that it 
would not apply to domestic workers. 
 
The COSATU structure responsible for discussing this was the LWC (also or later 
known as the Living Wage Working Group, LWWG), chaired by Jane Barrett 
(from COSATU’s transport workers’ union), which met fortnightly. Initially, the 
LWC proposed that the issue be discussed at the May 1990 COSATU National 
Campaigns Conference, with presentations for and against. It is not clear what kind 
of debate ensued, but it seems that several unions – including especially the 
Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) – raised 
concerns. 
 
‘SACTWU said that the National Minimum Wage will have serious 
economic consequences. The clothing industry world-wide is busy 
moving to area [sic] with low labour costs. A National Minimum Wage 
will cause great unemployment at [sic] it will remove the competitive 
advantage of the major clothing producing areas. SACTWU favours a 
policy of sectoral minimum wages based on the ability to pay. The 
National Minimum Wage demand may have some value as a political 
statement or a mobilizing tool, but its adoption will work against the 
clothing industry in the future. SACTWU has no official position, 
however, on the National Minimum Wage’. 
 
The municipal workers’ union also worried that rural municipalities had little 
money. Two small unions worried that a national minimum wage would allow 
employers to avoid paying a living wage.4 The conference mandated the LWWG 
“to establish what National Minimum Wage should be suggested to develop a 
program of action to achieve a National Minimum Wage”, and deferred the 
                                                
4 ‘Notes on the discussion on the National Minimum Wage’, COSATU LRA/LWC conference, 
11-12 May 1990 (COSATU file 12.9.3).  
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decision on the actual level to the next National Campaigns Conference, then 
scheduled for August 1990.5 
 
In June, the LWWG debated the issue further. Martin Nicol (of the National Union 
of Mineworkers, NUM) circulated a document in which he criticised the Gordon 
Young proposals (as well as an article in the South African Labour Bulletin by 
Renee Roux) for suggesting that a national minimum wage could be set lower than 
a living wage. He criticized the others’ claim that a low national minimum was 
‘realistic’ because they relied on poverty datum lines rather than on Marxist 
analysis. He called instead for a renewed campaign for a living wage.6 The LWC 
discussed this, but agreed to recommend the figure of R700 as a ‘mobilising tool’.7 
This was a minimum wage, not a living wage. After the meeting, the LWWG 
circulated a photocopied National Minimum Wage Reader comprising Young’s 
document, relevant past resolutions and summaries of discussions, and a document 
entitled ‘How to set the level of the National Minimum Wage’. This was concerned 
entirely with the level of a national minimum wage, and thus reflected a rejection 
of Martin Nicol’s arguments. The document first suggested that any national 
minimum had to be higher than the poverty line of R550 per month. Ideally, it 
would be set at about two-thirds of the average wage – which was the demand of 
trade unions in Britain. This, in South Africa, would be about R1000 per month. 
The document immediately suggested caution: “But given the depth of the low-pay 
problem in certain key sectors of the economy, it is not realistic to set a National 
Minimum Wage at the two-thirds level immediately”. The document insisted also 
that the wage had to be ‘credible’: “This is not the same as saying that it will be 
achievable, only that employers will be obliged to take it seriously”. It should be 
‘useful’ to unions in wage campaigns: “In high-wage industries, unions will use the 
National Minimum Wage as a floor or safety net to wages; in low-wage industries, 
unions will use it as a goal” (implying that it would not be binding immediately). 
The document concluded that a national minimum should be set somewhere 
between R550 (poverty line) and R750 (half of the average wage) per month, and 
recommended the figure of R700 per month (or R160 per week or R3.60 per hour) 
for 1990-91. The document suggested that this would affect 1.2 million workers 
excluding domestic and farmworkers. The document did not discuss procedures, 
and did not mention the Wage Board.8 
 
                                                
5 ‘Introduction’ to ‘The National Minimum Wage Reader’ (COSATU file 12.9.3).  
6 ‘For a living wage or a national minimum wage?’ (COSATU file 12.9.3). 
7 Minutes of the LWC meeting, 19th June 1990 (COSATU file 12.9.1). 
8 The National Minimum Wage Reader (COSATU file 12.9.3). 
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This proposal was too low for some but too high for others. SACTWU was the 
primary critic in the latter camp. Lesley Maasdorp and Mark Bennett of SACTWU 
immediately responded in a document circulated within the LWWG. They 
recognized the benefits of calling for minimum wages, covering all workers (i.e. 
with countrywide coverage), but argued that these should be sectoral not national. 
The “main reason” for preferring sectoral minima “is one of economics”: Low 
wages do cause poverty, but low wages can be the result of low profitability in the 
sector; a uniform national minimum “might wipe out some industries altogether”, 
whereas sectoral minima can take into account the cost structure of the sector. They 
argued that 
  
‘… a minimum wage that is determined according to the cost structure of 
each industry would be better able to look after the interests of that sector 
and thereby the interests of the workers employed in that industry. … 
Undoubtedly the introduction of a minimum wage which does not take 
into account the cost structure of the industries would be disastrous. We 
know that in the clothing industry the profits made by employers are not 
as big as those made in the chemical industry. A similar situation exists 
in the mining industry where the price of metals, like gold and platinum, 
are determined by factors beyond the control of the local mining 
industry. The cost structure of the agricultural sector and the domestics 
sector would mean that hundreds of thousands of these workers would be 
turfed out of the jobs they are in’.  
 
They added that “we all know that one of the main crises facing South African 
society today is the high rate of unemployment”. A high national minimum would 
discourage job creation, and the state certainly did not have the resources to employ 
everyone on high wages. SACTWU worried also that the South African economy 
needed to expand its exports once sanctions were lifted, but a nationally-
determined high wage would inhibit international competitiveness. Indeed, they 
added, few trade union cooperatives could pay such high minima.  
 
‘A minimum wage should also take into account regional wage 
disparities … We all know that wages in the rural areas are often much 
lower than those paid for the same jobs in the urban areas. A nationally 
determined minimum wage, which does not take into account that rural 
area employers pay lower wages may have the effect of wiping out all 
industries within the rural areas. … Unless the minimum wage policy 
recognizes the regional disparities it would destroy industry on a wide 
scale’.  




SACTWU argued that sectoral minima could and should allow for appropriate 
regional variation in minimum wages.9 
 
SACTWU later summarized its position in a pamphlet (‘What are the alternatives 
to minimum wage laws?’). This asserted that minimum wages inhibit higher wages 
for some workers (for example in the chemicals sector or at South African 
Breweries) whilst risking the jobs of lower-paid workers. In a section titled ‘It 
undermines job security for lower paid workers’, it stated that R150 per week  
 
‘… is several times higher than wages in Isithebe or Babalegi [i.e. 
industrial areas in the ‘bantustans’, outside Durban and Pretoria 
respectively]. Accordingly the probability is that employers in these areas 
would go bankrupt immediately. Worse, people who are employed on 
farms, in the domestic sector and especially in the mines would 
immediately face huge retrenchments.’ (emphasis in pamphlet).  
 
The union advocated sectoral collective bargaining as the alternative, with sectoral 
minima in unorganized sectors. SACTWU also argued against a national minimum 
in articles in the press, pointing out that the labour-intensive clothing sector would 
be very hard hit by a uniformly high national minimum: 
 
‘If we set an across-the-board minimum wage without considering 
several unique factors which have an impact on every industry, we may 
adversely affect the future of many of these industries. We may 
completely wipe out some industries which will be vital for the social 
and economic reconstruction of a post-apartheid society. Some sectors of 
our economy can pay better wages than others because different factors 
affect industrial sectors differently… A minimum wage determined 
according to the cost structures of each industry would be better able to 
look after the interests of that sector and the interests of the workers 
employed there.’ (South, 27th September 1990, quoted in Lundall, 1991: 
7) 
 
COSATU debated the issue at its National Campaigns Conference in September 
1990. NUM, supported by the Transport and General Workers Union, supported 
                                                
9 ‘The National Minimum Wage: A Contribution to the Debate’, by Lesley Maasdorp and Mark 
Bennett for SACTWU, sent to the COSATU Living Wage Working Group, 24 June 1990 
(COSATU file 12.9.3.). 
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the R700 per month call. Several unions opposed it on the basis that this was too 
low. Other unions supported SACTWU’s position that minima should be sectoral, 
preferably set through collective bargaining. The National Union of Metalworkers 
of South Africa (NUMSA) reportedly argued strongly against the R700 national 
minimum because this would have a ‘disastrous’ effect on employment (Baskin, 
1991: 440-1; Moll, 1996: 44). The debate was later described as ‘heated’. The 
conference resolved that further research was required.10 
 
Gordon Young and the LRS reworked their proposals more fully in a paper 
published early the following year, making important concessions to criticisms 
such as SACTWU’s (Young, 1991). He proposed that the Wage Board – whose 
members were all appointed by the Government – be replaced by a new tripartite 
national institution and tripartite sectoral institutions, all with equal representation 
of trade unions, employers and ‘independent’ government-appointed members ‘to 
represent the national interest’ (as recommended by the ILO). The national 
minimum would provide a floor with regard to wages and employment conditions. 
Sectoral minima would have to be at or above the national minima. Trade unions 
would bargain collectively for wages above these minima. The national minimum 
wage ‘should not aim for a general rise in wages, but to protect the weakest 
sections of the workforce from gross exploitation’ (ibid: 16). The national 
institution would take into account factors such as the cost of living, affordability, 
and effects on employment and inflation. The LRS acknowledged that minimum 
wages in agriculture and perhaps some other sectors should be set at a lower level 
than minimum wages in urban areas, partly because a higher minimum ‘might well 
lead to considerable retrenchments amongst farm workers’ (ibid: 17). He referred 
to possible minima of R550 and 700, as discussed in COSATU, but did not himself 
recommend any specific level. His focus, rather, was on the procedures. 
 
Union-linked intellectuals discussed the minimum wage issue at a workshop at the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC) in March 1991, as part of a series of events 
bringing together ANC- and union-aligned economists to think through issues of 
post-apartheid policy-making. Gordon Young’s proposals for a national minimum 
were criticised by Dudley Horner, who had long been involved in struggles against 
low wages (Davie, 2007). Based at the University of Cape Town in the 1980s, 
Horner became an authority on minimum wages, producing meticulous digests of 
industrial council and Wage Board agreements. At the UWC workshop, Horner 
argued that it would be ‘irresponsible’ to ignore the social consequences of raising 
                                                
10 Martin Nicol (NUM), on behalf of the LWC, report to COSATU’s National Campaigns 
Committee, April 1991 (COSATU file 12.2.1). 
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wages to the level (R700/month, except for farmworkers, for whom the minimum 
should be R500/month) ) proposed by Young (Horner, 1991). Other researchers 
also emphasised the risks of negative employment effects, especially in labour-
intensive sectors employing less skilled workers (Lundall, 1991; Bhorat, 1991). 
 
COSATU was also wary. At its Campaigns Conference in March, delegates called 
for a campaign for job security and job creation (‘Jobs for All – No 
Retrenchments’) but rejected the LWC’s proposal to specify either a minimum or a 
living wage. Retrenchments pushed minimum wages out of the limelight. The 
LWC organised a “wage policy workshop” in order “to help affiliates develop 
wage policies within which context we can rediscuss the demand for a National 
Minimum Wage”.11 The national minimum was, however, hardly discussed at the 
workshop, although the workshop report mentioned it and a reformed Wage Board 
as two (alternative) ways in which ‘weak’ workers (outside of the trade unions) 
could be protected (Cooper, 1991). A ‘policy discussion paper’ presented to and 
discussed at the Central Executive Committee in April asked ‘Should there be a 
national minimum wage, a sectoral minimum wage or no minimum wage?’. But 
this question remained unanswered, and COSATU was distracted completely by 
the issue of retrenchments.12 By May, the LWC was reporting that the minimum 
wage issue has been put to one side: 
 
‘The debate about a National Minimum Wage: During 1990, COSATU 
debated whether or not we wanted to set a National Minimum Wage. 
There were fierce arguments for and against a minimum wage. However 
in the end it was decided that it was wrong to isolate the issue of a 
national minimum wage. Low wages were as a result of a particular kind 
of economic system and we should rather see the campaign for a 
minimum wage as part of a campaign for a better economy. It was felt 
that we should rather look towards adopting a WAGE POLICY as a 
federation – and not just a position on a national minimum wage.’13 
 
The conference report even recorded that “there should be minimum wages in 
different sectors”.14 
 
                                                
11 ‘Head Office Report to the CEC of 27-28 April 1991’ (COSATU file file 6.6), p.8. 
12 ‘Policy Discussion Paper’, presented to CEC, April 1991 (COSATU file 6.6). 
13 ‘Towards a wage policy for COSATU: Document produced by the Living Wage Committee’; 
COSATU Economic Policy Conference May 1991 (COSATU file 16.3). 
14 Report of COSATU Economic Policy Conference May 1991 (COSATU file 16.3), p25. 
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This is the last mention for some time of the issue of a national minimum wage in 
COSATU’s papers. The Central Exexutive Committee met in June, September and 
November 1991, and in March, July, August and October 1992. COSATU held a 
National Congress in mid-1991, a Living Wage Conference in June 1992 and a 
Campaigns Conference in September 1992. There is no mention of minimum 
wages in any of the documentation relating to these events. The issue had dropped 
off the agenda. 
 
 
Retrenchments, economic policy and wages 
 
From early 1991 COSATU was preoccupied by the challenge of retrenchments, 
especially in manufacturing industry. Manufacturing employment declined by 6 
percent between 1988 and 1992, with employment falling in the metal products 
industry by 12 percent and in clothing and textiles by 23 percent, Mining 
employment fell by a massive 32 percent between 1987 and 1995 (South Africa, 
1996a: 97). This affected massively two of COSATU’s largest affiliates. Between 
its 1991 National Congress and 1994 National Congress, the membership of 
NUMSA fell from 273,241 to 169,598, i.e. a drop of close to 40 percent. 
COSATU’s third biggest affiliate, SACTWU, lost one-fifth of its members over the 
same period. Despite the rapid growth of the public sector unions, and rising union 
membership in the (shrinking) mining sector, the total membership of COSATU’s 
affiliates actually declined between 1991 and 1993.15 It was hardly surprising that 
COSATU chose to campaign over ‘Jobs for All – No Retrenchments’. In practice, 
COSATU was even more distracted by the challenges of negotiating with the state 
over reforms to labour market policies and institutions and other public policies 
affecting unions (including VAT and pension reforms), and negotiating with (and 
within) the ANC over post-apartheid economic policy. In late 2002, COSATU 
hatched the idea of a ‘Reconstruction Accord’ to address the challenges of 
rebuilding the post-apartheid economy. This evolved into the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) adopted by the ANC as its de facto manifesto for 
the 1994 democratic elections.  
 
COSATU embraced the idea that the state should play a prominent role in 
regulating the economy. Its 1990 ‘Draft Document on Economic Policy’ accepted 
that the economy would remain ‘mixed’ (in terms of public/private ownership) but 
                                                
15 Audited membership as reported to COSATU Congresses: see documents for Special CEC 
Meeting 29 June 1991 (COSATU file 6.6), 1993 Special Congress,10-12 September 1993 
(COSATU file file 5.6) and 1994 National Congress, 7-10 September 1994 (COSATU file 5.7). 
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would be ‘reconstructed’ and ‘restructured’ through a mix of ‘developmental’ 
industrial policy and ‘growth through redistribution’ in a ‘high employment, high 
wage, high productivity’ economy. COSATU denounced low wages, not least 
because of the apartheid or racial wage gap between high-earning white employees 
and lower-earning black workers. But COSATU was well aware that the economy 
was in crisis, that retrenchments were wrecking havoc on its affiliates in 
manufacturing, and wages were not irrelevant to the competitiveness of South 
African firms. 
 
The result was caution on minimum wages even among the most statist proponents 
of reform. The Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG), dominated by 
economists linked to the British and South African Communist parties, published 
its report in late 1993. The report argued that low-wage employment was 
inefficient, and advocated a national minimum wage to improve efficiency in the 
use of unskilled labour. A higher wage would push employers to innovate, 
restructure and invest in their employees’ skills and productivity. Low-wage – i.e. 
‘unprofitable and inefficient’ – enterprises should not be tolerated. But MERG’s 
actual proposal was for what MERG itself called a “conservative and cautious 
initial approach to setting” a national minimum, covering only the very lowest-
paid:  
 
‘The primary aim of the national minimum wage is not to achieve a rapid 
general rise in wages, but to improve the wages and productivity of the 
lowest-paid members of the work-force, say the bottom 10 per cent of the 
current wage distribution’ (MERG, 1993: 163).  
 
The report seemed to endorse Young’s lower minimum of R550/month (in 1990 
prices). MERG recommended the establishment of a tripartite national Wage Board 
to set a national minimum as well as sectoral boards to set higher sectoral minima 
(MERG, 1993: 162-5). 
 
Even more cautious than MERG was the union-linked Industrial Strategy Project 
(ISP), whose recommendations were circulated widely in 1993-94 (see, e.g. ISP, 
1994) although the full synthesis report was finally published in 1995 (Joffe et al., 
1995). Whereas MERG’s brief was macro-economic, the ISP was concerned 
specifically with restoring South Africa’s industrial competitiveness. The ISP 
declared that the first objective of industrial policy was to create employment. 
Raising wages was not included in its four objectives. The ISP’s proposed strategy 
did revolve around increased productivity in manufacturing sectors but, in contrast 
to MERG, the ISP did not propose increasing real wages as a way of forcing 
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employers to improve their productivity. One of the ISP’s authors, Raphael 
Kaplinsky, went out of his way to emphasise that the ISP did not endorse a national 
minimum wage and even contemplated reduced real wages through currency 
depreciation and the informalisation of manufacturing (Kaplinsky, 1994: 535).16 
The ISP endorsed a primarily sectoral approach to collective bargaining over wages 
(with the expansion of regulation by Wage Boards to all sectors without collective 
bargaining) (Joffe et al., 1995: 92-3). 
 
With left-wing economic policy-makers urging caution on the minimum wage 
issue, it was unsurprising that minimum wages were hardly mentioned in the RDP. 
COSATU played a major role in drafting the RDP. In its initial ‘Proposal for a 
Reconstruction Accord’, COSATU identified political democratization as the top 
priority, followed by job creation. Wage increases were absent from the list.17 
COSATU did insist that the RDP reject explicitly a low-wage economic growth 
strategy.18 The final RDP declared that ‘all workers should be entitled to a living 
wage’, emphasised collective bargaining and mentioned minimum wage regulation 
as a component in the strategy “to achieve a living wage for rural and urban 
workers and reduce wage differentials” (ANC, 1994: 113). But it did not refer to 
either the Wage Board or a national minimum wage.  
 
Overall, the RDP reflected an “implicit intense suspicion of the future central state” 
on the part of COSATU and the left (Nattrass, 1994: 359). Shopfloor organisation 
and sectoral bargaining were pillars of COSATU’s strategy, as was evident in the 
‘Platform on Worker Rights’ adopted by COSATU in 1993. Collective bargaining 
should be conducted at workplace and sectoral levels, with sectoral bargaining 
forums for the negotiations of wages and working conditions. Pension and 
provident funds – a pressing issue for the unions at the time – should also be 
organized industry by industry. In sectors without strong trade unions, minimum 
wages and conditions should be set sector by sector, under a revised Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act.19 There was “a lively discussion on the issue of 
national and sectoral minimum wages” at a COSATU workshop in November 
1993, with some participants complaining that there was “still no policy” after 
                                                
16 The ISP’s synthesis report sat uneasily with Kaplinsky’s declaration, warning explicitly against 
the view that reduced wages would create jobs (Joffe et al., 1995: 19, 30). 
17 “COSATU’s Proposal for a Reconstruction Accord” (third draft, Feb 1993, for discussion at 
CEC March 1993) (COSATU file 6.8). 
18 COSATU’s comments on the 4th draft of the RDP, included in Documents for COSATU 
Special Congress 1993 (COSATU file 5.6). 
19 The adoption of the Platform was proposed by SACTWU (misspelt as SACTU) and seconded 
by NUMSA. Documents for COSATU Special Congress 1993 (COSATU file 5.6). 
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“three years of discussion” (adding that COSATU needed a policy in part so that it 
could respond to the MERG Report). But unions remained as divided as in 1990-
91, with SACTWU especially emphasising that the unions should rely on collective 
bargaining rather than legislation.20 
 
The minimum wage issue surfaced again at COSATU conferences in early 1994. A 
commission on ‘wage policy’ noted that three positions had emerged within 
COSATU:  
 
1. “to have no minimum wage legislation and let wages be decided entirely 
through collective bargaining”: this position begged the question of what 
to do about unorganized sectors; 
2. “to call for a relatively high minimum wage (say R1000 per month)” – 
but this “would be difficult to enforce and could lead to massive job 
loss”; 
3. “to call for a low minimum (say R500 per month) in order to reduce the 
unemployment effects” – but this posed the question “How will it look if 
COSATU supports such a low amount, even if it will improve things for 
millions of workers?”21 
 
This dilemma left COSATU unable to call for any national minimum wage. 
Instead, COSATU swung behind modest reforms, including the restructuring of the 
existing Wage Board and the extension of its remit to cover all sectors without 
collective bargaining (i.e. including farm and domestic workers), with continued 
regional differentiation ‘if necessary’, and taking into account (explicitly, for the 
first time) the cost of living and workers’ ability to meet their basic needs.22 
 
SACTWU played a major, perhaps decisive role in COSATU’s failure to endorse a 
national minimum. SACTWU organised in the low-wage shoe, leather and clothing 
manufacturing sectors, and the slightly higher wage textile manufacturing sector. 
Its membership in shoe manufacturing plummeted in the face of declining tariffs, 
despite the depreciation of the rand (Mosoetsa, 2005). This left the bulk of the 
union’s membership in the clothing sector. Minimum wages were highest in the 
Western Cape. Here, the starting wage for a machinist was raised to R196/week in 
                                                
20 ‘Summary of discussions and recommendations, COSATU CEC Workshop 18 November 
1993’, included in documents for COSATU Labour Market Policy Conference 18-20 Feb 1994 
(COSATU file 16.4) 
21 Documents for COSATU Campaigns Conference, March 1994 (COSATU file 12.2.1). 
22 Proposals discussed at March 1994 Campaigns Conference, summarised in ‘Report to 
COSATU CEC 21 October 1994’ (COSATU file 6.9(4)). 
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mid-1994, through a collective agreement in the industrial council. In Port 
Elizabeth, however, the minimum starting wage was raised in late 1994 to only 
R182/week, and in the Northern Cape and Free State it was raised to only 
R140/week.23 Approximately 30 percent of clothing workers were employed in 
factories in the bantustans, where wages were not regulated at all, and were a small 
fraction of those in the industrial council areas. Whilst there are no definitive data, 
it is likely that more than one-third of South African clothing workers were paid 
less than R500/week at the end of 1994, and many more were paid little more than 
this. This was a sector where the union understood very well that a high national 
minimum would accelerate job destruction.  
 
SACTWU leaders were also strong proponents of unions’ continued independence 
from government even after the achievement of political democracy. SACTWU 
general secretary John Copelyn argued strongly that minimum wages should be 
negotiated by workers, through collective bargaining, rather than be set by the 
state; minimum wage legislation would “fundamentally undermine union 
independence” (Copelyn, 1991: 31). 
 
SACTWU’s assistant general secretary (Ebrhaim Patel) was at the forefront of 
developing an industrial strategy that would protect clothing jobs. The strategy 
revolved around government subsidies to employers to invest in new technologies 
that would result in higher labour productivity, and enable employers to pay higher 
wages whilst remaining competitive (or even improving their competitiveness). 
Neither the National Party government (in the early 1990s) or the ANC-led 
government from 1994 allocated the budget for the proposed subsidies. In the 
absence of any improvement in productivity, the union was compelled to moderate 
its wage demands, and to oppose the imposition of a high national minimum wage 
without regard for the conditions in individual sectors (Seekings & Nattrass, 
forthcoming).  
 
SACTWU and Patel were staunch defenders of a sectoral approach to wage 
bargaining and minimum-setting, but COSATU itself was organised sectorally. 
COSATU was formed in 1985 through the merger of industrial unions (mostly 
within FOSATU) and general or ‘community’ unions. The strength of the industrial 
unions ensured that COSATU adopted a policy of “one union one industry”, in 
terms of which unions in the same industry or sector should merge. Mergers were 
rarely straightforward (see Baskin, 1991: Chapters 7, 19 and 24). In the clothing 
sector, the two COSATU-affiliated unions only merged to form SACTWU in 1989 
                                                
23 Government Notices 779 (22 April 1994), 18313 (21 October 1994) and 2250 (23 Dec 1994). 
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(ibid: 304-7, 393-4). By the early 1990s, COSATU has achieved its goal of sectoral 
affiliates (although it continued to experience difficulties as unions poached 
members across sectoral lines). COSATU’s sectoral character predisposed it 
towards the continuation of the sectoral system of minimum wage-setting. 
 
 
Review and reform under the ANC-led 
government, 1994-96 
 
In May 1994 Tito Mboweni was appointed as Minister of Labour in South Africa’s 
first democratically-elected government. From the outset Mboweni made it clear 
that he had two objectives: To protect the interests of working people “within the 
context of tripartite agreements” involving the “social partners” (business and 
unions) and the state;24 and “to represent those whose voices are not heard loudly 
enough through the medium of organized business and labour”, i.e. small 
businesses and the “millions of unemployed”.25 In Mboweni’s view, the former 
required that business and labour negotiate at the sectoral level. The latter required 
that the state play an active role: “A certain amount of flexibility and mutual 
sacrifice is necessary if the imperatives of small business and the unemployed are 
to be addressed”.26 
 
Over the following two years labour legislation was subject to two separate 
processes of review. On the one hand, discussions continued within the existing, 
corporatist National Manpower Commission (NMC), until its role was taken over 
in 1995 by the new, but also corporatist, National Economic, Development and 
Labour Advisory Council (Nedlac). On the other hand, President Mandela 
appointed a Presidential Labour Market Commission to report on “the development 
of an institutional framework for integrating the dual requirements of rapid and 
sustainable economic and employment growth and rising average living standards” 
(whilst paying particular attention to “the impact of alternate mechanisms of wage 
determination on the development of small- and medium-scale enterprises” – South 
Africa, 1996a: xiii). With respect to minimum wage-setting, both processes 
converged on the reform of existing institutions rather than the introduction of a 
NMC. In both processes, trade unions helped to drive and endorsed this outcome. 
 
                                                
24 See, for example, Mboweni’s maiden speech in Parliament, Hansard, 27 May 1994, col. 269. 
25 Address to the Labour Law Conference, Durban, 1994 (included in Kalula and Woolfrey 
(1995)), 2-4. 
26 Ibid. 
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Progress was fast on the reform of the LRA providing for collective bargaining and 
the regulation of disputes including strikes. Discussions had begun within the 
NMC. A Bill was discussed in Nedlac, the reforms were discussed within the 
Labour Market Commission, and the new LRA was enacted, all in 1995. The Act 
provided for minimum wages to be negotiated by trade unions and employers’ 
associations in sectoral “bargaining councils” (the former industrial councils), and 
then extended countrywide by the Minister of Labour. This was, in part, a 
compromise, between employers (some of whom preferred enterprise-level 
bargaining) and the unions (who had demanded that employers should be required 
to participate in bargaining councils, doing away entirely with the need for 
extensions). One issue was not entirely resolved. In Nedlac, big business agreed to 
the near-automatic extension of bargaining council agreements, and this was 
incorporated into the LRA. The Labour Market Commission, however, 
recommended that extensions be more discretionary. As commissioner Gwede 
Mantashe, the assistant general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, 
reported back to COSATU: “In granting such extensions the Minister will have to 
be sensitive to possible disemployment effects of such extensions”.27 
 
The regulation of sectors without strong trade unions was less urgent and 
proceeded more slowly. Discussions continued in both the NMC/Nedlac and 
Labour Market Commission. These two processes were connected through specific 
individuals as well as through the support provided by the ILO (which readmitted 
South Africa as a member following the democratic elections). In May 1994, 
immediately after the democratic elections, the NMC hosted a workshop on 
minimum wages, with a presentation by the ILO’s Zafar Shaheed (1994). Two 
years earlier the NMC had been ‘restructured’, accommodating representatives of 
COSATU and other independent trade unions, as well as experts appointed by the 
government (obviously in consultation with the ANC, given that most of the 
experts were ANC or COSATU-aligned). Minimum wages were one of the issues 
on the new NMC’s agenda, but the NMC did not appear to do anything other than 
host the workshop. At the workshop, Shaheed focused on the ILO conventions and 
avoided any discussion of the choice between national and sectoral (or regional) 
minima. The following year the ILO appointed a ‘Country Review’ team to support 
the Presidential Labour Market Commission by analysing the South African labour 
market. The ILO team was sharply critical of the existing Wage Board system, 
which it described as “haphazard”, “with almost arbitrary selective coverage, low 
wage minima, infrequent revisions and poor conditions of employment attached to 
                                                
27 Record of COSATU Living Wage Conference, 19-21 April 1996 (Jane Barrett papers, 
University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers A 2168, box O.5). 
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them”. But the team did not propose any new mechanism for setting minima and 
did not endorse calls for a national minimum wage. Indeed, the report seemed to 
conclude that a system of sectoral minima through “a reformed Wage Board” was 
the only real option. The ILO team summarised, with apparent approval, a 
submission by consultants Andrew Levy and Associates that suggested that  
 
‘while a national minimum wage would send out a signal that the Government 
cares about unprotected workers, the monitoring and enforcement functions would 
be “a continual headache”, so that the enforcement bureaucracy would be 
ineffectual and would be “public money poorly spent”’ (Standing, Sender & 
Weeks, 1996: 212). 
 
The ILO “country review” team was clearly influenced by the South Africans – 
especially in the Labour Market Commission – with whom they worked. The 
Commission comprised prominent trade unionists, businessmen and independent 
experts. The unionists included co-chair David Lewis (who was Special Advisor to 
the Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni), Jeremy Baskin (who headed COSATU’s 
new research unit, Naledi) as well as Mantashe (from the NUM). Baskin had long 
been involved in thinking about the minimum wage within COSATU. On the 
Commission he articulated strongly the dilemma posed at the COSATU workshop 
earlier that year (see above): the unions could not leave sectors unregulated, could 
not demand a high national minimum given the difficulties facing the economy, but 
nor could they defend a low national minimum.28 Baskin was very aware of the 
perception that unionised workers in formal employment constituted a semi-
privileged “labour aristocracy” (Baskin, 1996: 6-7). All three of the positions above 
risked fuelling criticisms because all three invited the accusation that COSATU did 
not really care about unorganised workers. The solution was to reform the existing 
Wage Board and avoid a national minimum entirely. 
 
In its report, the Commission emphasised the imperative of creating more as well 
as better jobs through a “labour-absorbing growth path” that expanded labour-
intensive production (in sectors such as clothing manufacturing) and improved 
productivity (South Africa, 1996a: 9, 18-22, 34-6, 51). The Report acknowledged 
that labour costs were high, but argued for a balance between security and 
flexibility.  
 
‘The Commission does not believe it is realistic to set one national 
minimum wage. Rather, sectoral minima should be set. And while there 
                                                
28 Recollections by Nicoli Nattrass, who was one of the independent experts on the Commission. 
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is a need to avoid too complex a set of minimum determinations, there 
may at times be a need to differentiate geographically or to set a cross-
sectoral minimum for a specific locality. … In reaching its decisions, the 
[Wage] Board should be guided by the need for a fair wage and decent 
conditions, the financial circumstances of the employers, and the social 
conditions and economic prospects prevailing in the sector/locality 
concerned. It should be particularly mindful of the employment 
implications of its recommendations. … [T]he Commission notes that, in 
practice, minimum wages will need to be set at modest levels if 
employment generation is not to be harmed’ (ibid: 66-7). 
 
The Commission did not rule out the possibility of agreement “at some future 
point” over a national minimum wage (ibid: 66). It recommended that the Wage 
Board be especially cautious in setting minima for farm and domestic workers 
(ibid: 69-70), and proposed that the Wage Board include members with (inter alia) 
“an appropriate degree of independence from unions and employer organisations” 
(ibid: 67). The key recommendations of the Labour Market Commission were 
reported back to COSATU by the unionists on the Commission. In April 1996, for 
example, Mantashe reported back to COSATU that “the Commission supports 
sectoral minima instead of a national minima” (sic).29 
 
Shortly before the Commission completed its report, but after it was clear what the 
report would recommend, the Ministry of Labour published a Green Paper on 
‘Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute’. This proposed that 
“the Wage Board should be revitalised and reconstituted as an Employment 
Standards Commission and its functions extended” (South Africa, 1996b: para 12). 
The new government’s thinking was explicitly framed by its anxieties about 
unemployment. In his foreword to the Green Paper, Mboweni wrote that: 
 
‘This year the government has stressed the critical importance of job 
creation. This raises important questions for the debate on the law 
proposed in the Green Paper. Can we use the proposed law to promote 
employment creation? Could some rights hinder employment creation? 
The Department has taken these issues into account in preparing its 
proposals. This is an important issue for debate. The first prize is a law 
that can set fair employment standards and promote the creation of new 
                                                
29 Report of the COSATU Living Wage Conference, 19-21 April 1996. See also Baskin (1996): 
13. 
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jobs. Striking the correct balance will be a difficult issue but it is one in 
which wide public participation is important’ (South Africa, 1996b: 2). 
 
Mboweni also appointed an interim Wage Board, with Dudley Horner as the 
interim chairperson. Horner had previously been a fierce critic of the Board in the 
1980s but in the 1990s began to argue that it should be strengthened, not abolished 
(Horner, 1991, 1995).  
 
The practical difficulties inherent in setting any national minimum were revealed 
again later in 1996, when Mboweni directed the interim Wage Board to examine 
minimum wages in the clothing industry. Clothing workers outside of areas 
covered by regional bargaining councils were covered by Wage Determination 
(WD) 471. Like other WDs, however, this excluded workers in the former 
bantustans. In the case of the clothing industry, about 30 percent of workers were in 
the former bantustans. Mboweni asked the Wage Board to recommend how to 
extend WD 471 to the former bantustans, “with due regard to the problems being 
experienced in this industry”.30 On the basis of the Wage Board’s 
recommendations, WD 471 was amended to cover the bantustans in mid-1997. The 
minimum wage was set at R91.60/week, except in Phutaditjaba (in QwaQwa, in the 
southern Free State), where the minimum was only R81/week (and employers were 
given a further six months grace before the minimum came into effect). These 
minima were far below the lowest national minimum ever proposed within 
COSATU. They were so low – and much lower than in either the areas covered by 
regional industrial councils or the old areas covered by WD 471 – because Horner 
was deeply concerned by the possibility of factory closures and massive 
retrenchments (see further Nattrass, 2000). 
 
Whilst the interim Wage Board was reviewing WD 471, Mboweni presented the 
draft of a new Basic Conditions of Employment Bill to Nedlac. The Bill provided 
(inter alia) for the establishment of a new ‘Employment Conditions Commission’ 
(ECC) to replace the Wage Board. The new ECC would recommend minima for 
sectors where there was no collective bargaining between unions and employers. 
Unlike the Wage Board, its remit would cover agricultural and domestic workers. It 
                                                
30 ‘Partial Wage Board Investigation: Amendment of Wage Determination 471: Clothing and 
Knitting Industry, RSA’, Government Notice R.1733 (25 October 1996). It is not clear why 
Mboweni did not ask Horner to examine also other WDs with similar limits, for example WD 
478 on the wholesale and retail trade. It is possible that WD 471 was singled out because of the 
influence of SACTWU, which was at the time trying to pull and push employers into forming a 
national bargaining council. Revising WD 471 might have been politically useful to SACTWU as 
an incentive to employers to come to the table. 
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would also have representatives of business and labour, alongside experts 
appointed by the government.  
 
Nedlac was established to provide for corporatist negotiation over, especially, 
labour legislation. In 1995, business and labour had reached agreement over almost 
all of the provisions of a new Labour Relations Bill. Two years later, however, 
business and labour failed to agree over much of the new Basic Conditions of 
Employment Bill. Negotiations were “adversarial and difficult” (Godfrey, Maree & 
Theron 2006: 85). Mboweni met separately with organized business and organized 
labour because, as he later told parliament, they had become “unwilling to meet in 
one room” together!31 In October 1997, Mboweni took his Bill to Parliament 
despite having failed to reach agreement in Nedlac. The Bill was first discussed in 
the portfolio committee, then in the full parliament. The Act was eventually passed 
by the ANC majority, in the face of opposition from other parties, at the very end 
of 1997. 
 
Introducing the Bill, Mboweni emphasized that the Bill extended “protection to 
vulnerable and low-paid workers who are not covered by existing legislation”. He 
drew attention to three major sectors that were not covered under existing 
legislation: 
 
‘As Minister of Labour, I am often stopped at airports, in supermarkets 
and restaurants and in the streets, and asked many questions. Somebody 
will say: “I used to work for a security company. I was dismissed and 
given one day’s notice. Is that lawful?” Somebody else will say: “I am a 
domestic worker and I am forced to work for weeks on end, without a 
day off. Is that legal?” When I travel around farming areas of the country, 
I am confronted by farmworkers who ask: “When is this democratically 
elected Government going to stop farmers from paying farmworkers 
exploitative wages?”’32 
 
He drew specific attention to the fact that statutory wage setting was to be extended 
to domestic and farm workers.33 
 
The Bill was opposed, in Nedlac and then in Parliament, not by trade unionists but 
by business and business-aligned opposition parties. Their criticisms were not of 
                                                
31 Hansard, 5th November 1997, col.5940-1. 
32 Ibid, col. 5932. 
33 Ibid, col. 5935. 
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the expansion of wage-setting to agricultural and domestic workers, but rather 
concerned the regulation of conditions of employment, including especially 
restrictions on the length of the working week, provision for maternity leave, their 
effects on small business and (critics claimed) the possible effects on job creation. 
The only substantive concern raised by COSATU was over what it identified as a 
shift in discourse between the LRA and the new Bill, with increased use of the term 
‘flexibility’. This reminded them of the ‘dual labour market’ model advocated by 
some economists and strongly opposed by COSATU.34  
 
The Act provided for an ECC that was a mix of corporatist and technocratic, as 
recommended by the ILO. The ECC would include members nominated by trade 
unions and business, as well as experts appointed by the Minister after consultation 
with Nedlac. One of the experts would serve as chairperson. The primary 
responsibility of the ECC was to recommend minimum wages and conditions of 
employment when asked to do so by the Minister. The ECC was required to take 
into account ‘the ability of employers to carry on their businesses successfully; the 
operation of small, medium and micro enterprises, and new businesses; the cost of 
living; the alleviation of poverty; …; wage differentials and inequality; and the 






The establishment of the ECC completed the reform of South Africa’s wage-setting 
institutions. The Minister of Labour and ANC emphasised that this was a new 
system, and it was in the sense that it brought all workers under the jurisdiction of 
institutions that had been concerned primarily with white workers hitherto. But the 
institutions themselves were essentially the ones that had existed for more than half 
a century, had atrophied, and were not resuscitated. In sectors with strong unions 
and employers’ associations, these parties negotiated in sectoral bargaining 
councils, and the Minister of Labour then extended the agreements countrywide. In 
sectors without strong unions and employers’ associations, wages and conditions 
were regulated by an institution (the ECC) that combined corporatist and 
technocratic elements. The approach was fundamentally sectoral. There was no 
national minimum wage. Collective bargaining took precedence. If a bargaining 
                                                
34 For COSATU’s response, see its Press Statement on 13th February 1996 and its undated ‘Focus 
on the Employment Standards Bill’ (http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=677 and 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2003, accessed 24th January 2015) 
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council was established in a sector hitherto regulated by the ECC, then the ECC 
ceded responsibility to the bargaining council.35 Only if corporatist bargaining fora 
were clearly unrepresentative (as in the contract cleaning, civil engineering and 
private security sectors) did the Minister of Labour continue to instruct the ECC to 
recommend minima. Nonetheless, through the 2000s the ECC regulated the wages 
of somewhere between three and four million workers (and possibly more).  
 
As expected, sectoral procedures meant that conditions in the sector were taken into 
account in setting minima. In practice this was true under both the LRA and the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Although the LRA did not require 
bargaining councils or the Minister to take employment effects into account (as the 
Labour Market Commission had suggested), in practice the bargaining councils 
sometimes did consider employment effects because job destruction generated bad 
publicity and some of the workers whose jobs might be destroyed were union 
members. The ECC was required to take into account employment effects, and its 
technocratic and corporatist members usually ensured that it did so. The result was 
that minima were generally set at a low level in labour-intensive, low-wage and 
low-profit sectors, including clothing manufacturing (until 2002, when a National 
Bargaining Council was established), the private security sector, domestic work 
and (until 2013) agriculture. 
 
In practice, and in contrast to institutions such as the Low Pay Commission in the 
UK, neither the Department of Labour nor the ECC had much capacity to conduct 
sectoral research, and they generally worked with very limited information about 
affordability and likely job destruction. They tended towards caution when setting 
minima, and subsequently raised minima incrementally. They also persisted with 
regional differentiation, allowing lower minima in (especially) rural areas. The 
minima recommended by the ECC did, however, rise steadily over time in real 
terms (i.e. taking inflation into account), and they did so more or less in line with 
the minima in comparable sectors that were negotiated by trade unions through 
bargaining councils. The trade unionists on the ECC rarely dissented from the 
commission’s recommendations (Seekings, forthcoming). 
 
Business was opposed to the centralisation of wage-setting at the national level, 
whether through collective bargaining or the Wage Board/ECC, and the ANC 
Minister of Labour (Mboweni) was keen to keep business within the corporatist 
                                                
35 For example, when a National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry 
was established in 2002, the ECC ceded responsibility for regulating clothing workers in areas 
outside of the jurisdiction of the existing, regional bargaining councils. 
    
 
 30 
fold. But the preservation of sectoral wage-setting reflected especially the position 
of labour, and labour-allied intellectuals. Some unions favoured national wage-
setting, but sectoral wage-setting was defended strongly by unions in more labour-
intensive sectors, especially SACTWU, and by allied intellectuals (such as Horner 
and Kaplinsky) who worried about the effects of high minima on employment in 
low-wage sectors such as clothing, agriculture and domestic work. COSATU 
leaders and intellectuals (such as Baskin) came to see the demand for a national 
minimum as a trap that the unions should avoid, because whatever level it was set 
at would result in criticisms of the unions as uninterested in the welfare of low-
wage workers. Many unionists were also jealous of their independence and 
distrustful of the state. They sought to preserve the tradition of shopfloor 
organization within unions and a sectoral demarcation of responsibility between 
unions. Massive retrenchments in manufacturing in the early 1990s fuelled unions’ 
anxieties about high unemployment, compelled them to moderate wage demands 
and focused their attention on industrial restructuring and economic growth rather 
than wages per se. The ILO also advised sensitivity to employment and other 
economic issues. In the absence of compelling alternative models on the agenda, 
the existing institutions (industrial councils and the Wage Board) were reformed 
(and renamed). This was a good example of path dependency in institutional 
design. 
 
Through the 2000s and into the 2010s, the Department of Labour, appointed 
technocrats, business and labour broadly concurred over the sectoral regulation of 
wages and conditions. The Department of Labour and business and technocrat 
members of the ECC generally adopted a more caution approach to raising minima, 
whilst labour representatives (and, in 2013 with respect to farmworkers, the ANC) 
advocated larger increases, but the differences in practice were almost always 
small. There was general consensus that minima should rise steadily, but from low 
starting-points and at a modest pace, taking into account conditions in each sector. 
 
Only in the 2010s did this consensus begin to unravel, as COSATU apparently 
embraced demands for more radical restructuring of labour market institutions to 
increase its own power and effect a massive increase in minimum wages. This is 
not the place for an analysis of what changed between the 1990s and the 2010s, but 
factors contributing to this shift probably included the weakening of collective 
bargaining,36 the associated general shift in the union movement from a strategy 
                                                
36 Generally, trade unions are less enthusiastic about statutory minimum wages when collective 
bargaining is strong, and become more interested when collective bargaining weakens (as in the 
UK in the late twentieth century and Germany in the early twenty-first century). 
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based on workplace organisation to one increasingly dependent on political access 
to the state (Buhlungu, 2010), the concomitant decline of manufacturing unions 
relative to public sector unions and a shift in the composition of unions’ 
membership from less to more skilled and lower to higher-paid workers (Seekings, 
2015), growing interest in national minimum wage-setting elsewhere in the world, 
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